To localize wheat ESTs on chromosomes, 882 homoeologous group 6-specific ESTs were identified by physically mapping 7965 singletons from 37 cDNA libraries on 146 chromosome, arm, and sub-arm aneuploid and deletion stocks. The 882 ESTs were physically mapped to 25 regions flanked by 23 deletion breakpoints. Of the 5154 restriction fragments detected by 882 ESTs, 2043 were localized to group 6 chromosomes and 806 were mapped on other chromosome groups. The number of loci mapped was greatest on chromosome 6B and (...) least on 6D. The 264 ESTs that detected orthologous loci on all three homoeologs using one restriction enzyme were used to construct a consensus physical map. The physical distribution of ESTs was uneven on chromosomes with a tendency toward higher densities in the distal halves of chromosome arms. About 43% of the wheat group 6 ESTs identified rice homologs upon comparisons of genome sequences. Fifty-eight percent of these ESTs were present on rice chromosome 2 and the remaining were on other rice chromosomes. Even within the group 6 bins, rice chromosomal blocks identified by 1-6 wheat ESTs were homologous to up to 11 rice chromosomes. These rice-block contigs were used to resolve the order of wheat ESTs within each bin. (shrink)

To describe the content of practice guidelines on euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS) and to compare differences between settings and guidelines developed before or after enactment of the euthanasia law in 2002 by means of a content analysis. Most guidelines stated that the attending physician is responsible for the decision to grant or refuse an EAS request. Due care criteria were described in the majority of guidelines, but aspects relevant for assessing these criteria were not always described. Half of the (...) guidelines described the role of the nurse in the performance of euthanasia. Compared with hospital guidelines, nursing home guidelines were more often stricter than the law in excluding patients with dementia (30% vs 4%) and incompetent patients (25% vs 4%). As from 2002, the guidelines were less strict in categorically excluding patients groups (32% vs 64%) and in particular incompetent patients (10% vs 29%). Healthcare institutions should accurately state the boundaries of the law, also when they prefer to set stricter boundaries for their own institution. Only then can guidelines provide adequate support for physicians and nurses in the difficult EAS decision-making process. (shrink)

This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect of social (...) interaction, and second, ‘what—and how—people think’, the conceptual, classifying, cognitive component of human culture. Now in reality, of course (and perhaps not so ‘of course’; people do tend to think of them as separate ‘things’), these two aspects are inextricably intertwined. But it is essential to distinguish them analytically, because each aspect gives rise to quite different kinds of problems of understanding for the social anthropologist. We shall see that the problem of how to be ‘objective’, and so to avoid ethnographic error, arises in both contexts, but in rather different forms in each. (shrink)

This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect of social (...) interaction, and second, ‘what—and how—people think’, the conceptual, classifying, cognitive component of human culture. Now in reality, of course (and perhaps not so ‘of course’; people do tend to think of them as separate ‘things’), these two aspects are inextricably intertwined. But it is essential to distinguish them analytically, because each aspect gives rise to quite different kinds of problems of understanding for the social anthropologist. We shall see that the problem of how to be ‘objective’, and so to avoid ethnographic error, arises in both contexts, but in rather different forms in each. (shrink)

Medium- and high-spin states of Pr-134 were populated using the Cd-116(Na-23, 5n) reaction and studied with the GAMMASPHERE spectrometer. Several new bands have been found in this nucleus, one of them being linked to the previously observed chiral-candidate twin-band structure. The ground state of Pr-134 could be determined through establishing a level structure that connects the two previously known long-lived isomeric states. Unambiguous spin-parity assignments for the excited states could be performed based on the known 2(-) spin-parity of the ground (...) state combined with the present experimental data. Intrinsic single-particle configurations have been assigned to the newly observed bands on the basis of the measured B(M1)/B(E2) ratios, alignments, band-crossing frequencies, bandhead spins, the observed single-particle configurations in the neighboring nuclei, and taking into account the predictions of total Routhian surface and tilted-axis cranking calculations. (shrink)

The subject of this study is the relation between dialectic and dialogue. First an attempt is made to delineate a universe of discourse 'communication'. Mutual acknowledgement as a subject ('intersubjectivity') is proposed as a distinctive characteristic of the concept of dialogue, and a distinction is made between several classes of dialogue (see the diagram). Then the concept of dialectic is examined. Special attention is paid to the question what is to be understood by the term 'modern dialectical thinking' (from Fichte (...) onwards). Because it seems impossible to describe dialectic as a method in a methodical way, or to find some one characteristic common to such divergent dialectical philosophies as those of Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Engels, Marxism-Leninism and various forms of Neo-Marxism (L. Goldmann, Th. Adorno, E. Bloch), the proposal is made to stipulate that the terms dialectic, dialectical method and dialectical thinking in the modern sense should only be used when negation and/or contrast (in a specific sense, peculiar to the thinkers mentioned) characterize a mode of thinking in a more or less systematic way. After these preliminaries the relation between dialogue and dialectic is examined as it presents itself from an historical point of view. As regards Plato, it is contended that his dialektikê technê neither constitutes a dialogal philosophy, nor a dialogic (theory of the dialogue). His 'dialogues' rather are an instance of the 'literary dialogue' (with agogic intentions). Hegel's way of thinking is characterized as monological and speculative. Though his conception of thought as a process, as well historical as collective, does not logically exclude a dialogue, his attitude towards it seems to be rather cool (or at least ambiguous). With Marx the concept of the class struggle enters the dialectic and this concept is essentially inimical to the concept of the dialogue as a peaceful means of solving conflicts. In Marxism-Leninism the distinction between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions (necessitated by the universalization of the dialectic by Engels and the Russian pretension of having founded the socialist state) implies the view that only in socialist and communist societies fundamental contradictions are absent and that consequently only within these societies there is no need for non-peaceful means of solving conflicts. In the thought of Th. Adorno, M. Horkheimer and H. Marcuse there seems to be no room for a dialogue, as a consequence of the Utopian implications of their concept of negation. Only in J. Habermas we meet with a positive attitude towards the (social-practical) dialogue. For him the dialogue even is 'the normative foundation' of his 'critical theory' of society. Dialectic is seen by him as a consequence of a repression of the dialogue (and so the dialogue as an antidote against the dialectic of ‘Verdinglichung’). The main conclusion drawn from this historical survey is that, as far as modern dialectical thinking is concerned, dialectic exhibits an antithetic relation towards the concept of dialogue generally, and more specifically towards the 'social-practical dialogue'. With all these thinkers a positive attitude towards dialectical thinking de facto implies a negative evaluation of the dialogue (or at least coolness towards it), or conversely (Habermas). Finally the author presents some considerations of a more general nature: that dialectic and dialogue are not to be considered correlative concepts, because contrasting opinion (not dialectic) is a sufficient condition for the dialogue; that the startingpoint for a social-practical dialogue may be found in the concept of 'problematic situations related to generally accepted ends' (such as e.g. well-being); that the socialpractical dialogue is directed at a consensus indeed, at least directly, but that this does not prevent it from being directed indirectly at the truth; that the concept of synthesis constitutes the normative foundation of the dialogue, because the ideal consensus consists in a synthesis of contrasting points of view. (shrink)

After some preliminaries concerning the original character of Rawls's formulation of the problem of social justice the author discusses the question, whether the proposed principles of justice for the basic structure of society bear the marks of a liberal theory.The conclusion of this part (IA) is that Rawls seems to have in view a mixed society, or perhaps rather a society which transcends the contrast between liberalism and socialism.Some critics have ascribed to Rawls the view of man of classical liberalism (...) and for this reason have considered him a liberal. The author contends that these critics do not seem to have grasped the purely methodological significance of the concept of the original position. After some preliminaries concerning the original character of Rawls's formulation of the problem of social justice the author discusses the question, whether the proposed principles of justice for the basic structure of society bear the marks of a liberal theory.The conclusion of this part (IA) is that Rawls seems to have in view a mixed society, or perhaps rather a society which transcends the contrast between liberalism and socialism.Some critics have ascribed to Rawls the view of man of classical liberalism and for this reason have considered him a liberal. The author contends that these critics do not seem to have grasped the purely methodological significance of the concept of the original position. After a short interlude in which the conceptions of justice of Marx and Rawls are compared (IB) the author presents some considerations of a critical nature as regards the principles of justice (IC). The distinction between the general and the special conception of justice hinges on the lixical priority of freedom. Now, a contradiction seems to emerge between the fact that the choice in favor of the special conception is an absolute one, valid for all societies regardless of time and place, and the fact that the general conception is sometimes presented as a first phase in the evolution of a well-ordered society (sect.82). This is an indication that in Rawl's theory the priority of freedom is not as absolute as he thinks it to be. The decisive point in this respect seems to be the fact that the „fair value of liberty” (Sect. 36) would demand that a subsistence minimum is lexically prior to freedom. These seem to be serious inconsistencies for which nnno remedy can be found and which are apt to lead us back to „instuitionism” The author considers next (and this is his main point) the logical structure of Rawls's contract theory, which in his opinion stands in urgent need of clarification. It is argued that the concept of contract as such implies a certain indifference or indeterminateness as regards its result. At the other hand, the result (that which is agreed upon, i.e. the principles of justice) is ex hypothesi considered to explain „our considered judgements” in reflective equilibrium. In this way it appears that Rawl's central idea (rather implicitly) is : there exists a consensus as regards our considered judgements concerning justice and this consensus may be explained as resulting from a (hypothetical) contract. So the argument really is of a hypothetico-deductive nature and it would have been much better if Rawls had been clear about it himself. Some critical considerations follow. First attention is paid to the fact that strict observance is an essential element of the concept of contract and that from this point of view the three psychological laws (chapt. VIII) are of crucial importance to the theory. Their nature, however, is not altogether clear. They are neither empirical laws (because they presuppose a just institutional structure and a just society is said not to exist), nor are they a priori ones. So it is only left for us to say that they are construed as empirical laws. Now, the difficulty for Rawls with this must be that reliance on such laws is inconsistent with the rationality of the parties in the original position, because as a matter of fact these laws have not been tested empirically (the fact that they can not be tested in this way makes no difference at all). Secondly it is asked whether we are dealing with a contract doctrine at all. Starting from the question, whether in this theory the notion of contract (intended to explain our considered judgements as givens) really is an ultimate explanatory concept, it is argued that there are some anthropological presuppositions, which rather point in the direction of a theory of self-realization. This seems to be confirmed by some other features of the theory, e. g. the Aristotelian principle, the Kantian interpretation, the concept of natural rights, and society as a social union of social unions. In conclusion, neither Rawls's principles of justice nor his contract theory are sufficiently consistent to escape the need of reconsideration. (shrink)

The author argues that there is a sharp contrast between Plato's earlier teleological explanation of nature and his later conception. In the Phaedo Anaxagoras' νοṽς as a teleological principle is rejected, the forms taking its place, in the Philebus the existence of a νοṽς explaining order and finality in nature, is strictly demonstrated. After that nature and consequences of this new doctrine are briefly discussed : the ineffable character of the transcendent cause of the world ; the reduction of the (...) number of the Forms to those of substances in nature ; the causality of νοṽς as an immanent and intermediate one ; the foundation of a mathematical science of nature. Thirdly the author makes an effort to reconstruct the philosophical grounds of this development, starting from the three theses, on which the argumentation of the Philebus is based. 1) νοṽς can only exist in a soul. It is argued that the dynamic conception of soul in the Phaedrus logically leads to the conclusion, that νοṽς also is movement . 2) To explain cosmic order and finality a νοṽς has to be accepted. This new idea occurs for the first time in the Sophistes and in the myth of the Politicus. 3) Cosmic order has a mathematical and astronomical character. This aspect is absent before the Philebus and seems to have been a consequence of Plato's discovery of the regularity in the planitary motions . Finally the author thinks he can indicate in the Sophistes the turning-point in the theory of Forms, as a result of the extension of the notion of being. (shrink)

It is given to few political thinkers to be at once as innovative and as self- contradictory as Jean Bodin. This paper examines the way in which a number of his ideas were developed in the seventeenth century, and attempts made, principally in Germany, the Netherlands and England, either to reconcile apparent contradictions within his thought or to exploit their ambiguity for political advantage. Elsewhere in Western Europe there was a more hostile response. In Counter-Reformation Spain Bodin was almost universally (...) disparaged as a politico, second only to Machiavelli in his alleged advocacy of the subordination of religion to political ends. His constructive ideas were taken rather more seriously in Counter-Reformation Italy, but there too there were attacks upon his secularism and negative criticism of his theory of sovereignty. In France itself Bodin was absorbed into the absolutist current, and since his reservations were weakened by the prevailing doctrine of divine right kingship, and his deviations generally forgotten, the problem of his legacy there is much less complex. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: Cognitive and sensory difficulties frequently jeopardize informed consent of frail elderly patients This study is the first to test whether preliminary research experience could enhance geriatric patients' capacity to consent. DESIGN/SETTING: A step-wise consent procedure was introduced in a study on fluid balance in geriatric patients. Eligible patients providing verbal consent participated in a try-out of a week, during which bioelectrical impedance and weight measurements were performed daily. Afterwards, written informed consent was requested. Comprehension, risk and inconvenience scores (ranges: (...) 0-10) were obtained before and after the try-out by asking ten questions about the study's essentials and by asking for a risk and inconvenience assessment on a ten-points rating scale. SUBJECTS AND RESULTS: Seventy of the 78 eligible subjects started the try-out and 53 (68%) provided written consent. The comprehension score increased from 5.0 (+/- 2.3) to 7.0 (+/- 1.9) following the try-out (P < 0.001). The number of subjects capable of weighing risks and inconveniences increased from 32 to 48 (P < 0.001). CONCLUSIONS: Research experience improved the capacity to consent, still enabling an acceptable participation rate. Therefore, experienced consent seems a promising tool to optimize informed consent in frail elderly subjects. (shrink)

Raynal and his collaborator, Diderot, offer views on the history and nature of the British Constitution in various parts of their encyclopedic account of Western expansion, The History of the Two Indies (1770, revised versions 1780 and 1784). These opinions are analysed in comparison with the judgments of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Bolingbroke, De Lolme and others. The evolution of Raynal's ideas on the subject is discussed in the light of his earlier anglophobic History of the Parliament of England (1748) and (...) the mutually contrasting French historians he used for that work, the Jesuit Pierre-Joseph d'Orleans and the Huguenot Paul de Rapin-Thoyras. Raynal's conversion to a liberal admiration for British institutions is seen both in the context of the American Revolution and his relationship with Diderot. His insistence on a historical approach clashes with Diderot's more radical and philosophical rhetoric, and the stress between their attitudes becomes apparent in the compromises they attain. Notable among their conclusions are the rejection of English appeals to antiquity, and the fortuitous development of liberty through a series of well defined stages. (shrink)